All apps

First-party app · S3 Sync

s3-sync

Sync PersonalClaw state between your machines through an S3-compatible store. Use AWS S3, a self-hosted MinIO, a NAS gateway, or any object store that speaks the S3 API — one you own. Requests are signed with AWS Signature V4 and travel through PersonalClaw's guarded egress chokepoint, pinned to the one endpoint you configure. Shards are encrypted end-to-end by default (the store never sees plaintext), and secrets are excluded upstream so they never reach it.

Before you install

A first-party app of PersonalClaw v0.3.9

No scan on record before install

PersonalClaw publishes no scan of its own apps before you install one.

PersonalClaw runs its own scan of the actual code of every app it installs: this one is rescanned when you install, and that scan is what can stop an install.

Its row on Compare: install rescan

Compatibility
Works with PersonalClaw v0.3.9

What it gets

Permissions
  • network: true
Its own network permission
On. Its own network permission is a declaration, not a fence.

What it reaches

Hosts it names
Not declared in this release's manifest

Its own code has no host list at this release: any hosts it names are for the programs, servers and sources it starts or fetches, not everything it can reach. Its own network permission is a declaration, not a fence.

Secrets you would enter

Settings marked secret
  • Access key ID
  • Secret access key
  • Session token

The app's settings file holds only a reference, the value lives in the credential store, and every route that shows settings masks it. The app's own code receives the value when it runs.

Its own code calls PersonalClaw's gateway with a token scoped to the app, not with your owner token.

What installing it gives and runs

The manifest's own declarations, under the names install consent shows them by and in its order. The Store adds, at install, which of them run as you.

Permissions it is granted
{
  "network": true
}
Provider modules the gateway loads
[
  {
    "type": "sync",
    "implementation": "provider:create_provider"
  }
]

Not declared in this release's manifest:

  • Scheduled jobs
  • Python packages installed for it
  • Engine packages it can install
  • What it needs that PersonalClaw does not install
  • Programs on this machine it starts
  • npm packages installed for it
  • Places outside its folder it writes
  • Pages it adds to the dashboard
  • Components it adds to the dashboard
  • A server process of its own
  • The sandbox tier its server runs in
  • Command run after install
  • Command run after an update
  • Command run when it is switched on
  • Command run when it is switched off
  • Command run before it is removed
  • What it runs for personalclaw setup
  • What it runs for personalclaw doctor
  • Connector sources it parses
  • MCP servers it adds
  • Skills it installs

Where it comes from

Publisher
PersonalClaw
License
MIT
Pinned commit
169cbc4f8fc59cd42a65a6a3546235bc49ab3b22
Signer
Not declared in this release's manifest

From review to enable

  1. Held and scanned. An install stages the app in quarantine, checks its signature, and runs the shared supply-chain scanner over the staged bytes before anything is shown for consent. A registry's recorded verdict is not read at install: the scan that can stop it is this one.Its row on Compare: install rescan
  2. A dangerous verdict ends it. A dangerous verdict returns a refusal before consent is asked, so there is no consent to give and no switch that skips it. A warning verdict asks for your consent instead.Its row on Compare: dangerous verdict
  3. You review and consent. The review records a digest of the staged bytes, and an install committed against different bytes is refused: it needs consent again, because the app changed after it was reviewed. An update that changes what the app gets asks for consent again too.Its row on Compare: consent
  4. Its setup runs, then you switch it on. Nothing it declares runs before your consent; an app already installed is offered as an update instead.

To install it and switch it on

  1. In PersonalClaw, open the Store.
  2. Find s3-sync.
  3. Review what it gets and runs, and consent.
  4. Install it, then switch it on.

Evidence

s3-sync/app.json at the pinned commit, as written, with the blob hash git lists for it: 13ac656bb88244d53eae978c8650b920bbeaed30

Open it at the commit

{
  "name": "s3-sync",
  "version": "0.1.9",
  "displayName": "S3 Sync",
  "description": "Sync PersonalClaw state between your machines through an S3-compatible store. Use AWS S3, a self-hosted MinIO, a NAS gateway, or any object store that speaks the S3 API — one you own. Requests are signed with AWS Signature V4 and travel through PersonalClaw's guarded egress chokepoint, pinned to the one endpoint you configure. Shards are encrypted end-to-end by default (the store never sees plaintext), and secrets are excluded upstream so they never reach it.",
  "icon": "Database",
  "author": "PersonalClaw",
  "license": "MIT",
  "tags": [
    "sync",
    "bundled"
  ],
  "permissions": {
    "network": true
  },
  "provider": {
    "id": "sync",
    "label": "Sync through an S3-compatible store",
    "type": "sync",
    "implementation": "provider:create_provider",
    "capabilities": [
      "sync"
    ],
    "settingsSchema": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "endpoint": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Endpoint URL",
            "help": "The S3 API endpoint, scheme included — e.g. https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com for AWS, or http://nas.local:9000 for a self-hosted MinIO. This single host is the ONLY host the transport may reach: egress is pinned to it. Leave empty to configure later — the transport stays idle until set.",
            "tags": [
              "advanced"
            ]
          }
        },
        "bucket": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Bucket",
            "help": "The bucket that holds the sync root. Create it yourself, keep it private, and point every machine at the same one."
          }
        },
        "prefix": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Key prefix",
            "help": "Optional path inside the bucket to confine the sync root to (e.g. personalclaw/). Leave empty to use the bucket root."
          }
        },
        "region": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "us-east-1",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Region",
            "help": "The region used when signing requests. Must match the bucket's region for AWS S3; any value works for MinIO (use us-east-1 unless it is configured otherwise)."
          }
        },
        "access_key_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Access key ID",
            "help": "Access key for a least-privilege identity scoped to THIS bucket and prefix only. Leave empty to fall back to the PERSONALCLAW_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID environment variable. Deliberately NOT the ambient AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / instance-role chain — this transport never borrows whatever credentials happen to be in your shell.",
            "sensitive": true
          }
        },
        "secret_access_key": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Secret access key",
            "help": "Secret for the access key above. Leave empty to fall back to the PERSONALCLAW_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY environment variable. Stored by the credential store, never echoed back by the settings API.",
            "sensitive": true
          }
        },
        "session_token": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Session token",
            "help": "Only for temporary (STS) credentials. Leave empty for a long-lived access key. Falls back to PERSONALCLAW_S3_SESSION_TOKEN.",
            "sensitive": true,
            "tags": [
              "advanced"
            ]
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
Scan verdict
No scan on record before install
Scan time
No scan is published before install
Blocking findings
No scan is published before install
Scanner version
No scan is published before install

PersonalClaw publishes no scan of its own apps before you install one.

  • Every app is scanned again when you install it, whatever its listing says.

    An install stages the app in quarantine, checks its signature, and runs the shared supply-chain scanner over the staged bytes before anything is shown for consent. A registry's recorded verdict is not read at install: the scan that can stop it is this one.

    apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9
  • A dangerous scan verdict stops the install, and nothing overrides it.

    A dangerous verdict returns a refusal before consent is asked, so there is no consent to give and no switch that skips it. A warning verdict asks for your consent instead.

    apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9
  • Consent covers exactly what you reviewed, and an app that changed asks again.

    The review records a digest of the staged bytes, and an install committed against different bytes is refused: it needs consent again, because the app changed after it was reviewed. An update that changes what the app gets asks for consent again too.

    apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9
  • A setting an app marks secret is kept in the credential store and never shown back.

    The app's settings file holds only a reference, the value lives in the credential store, and every route that shows settings masks it. The app's own code receives the value when it runs.

    apps/secret_fields.py at v0.3.9

PersonalClaw/PersonalClawApps @ 169cbc4f8fc5 · s3-sync/app.json